Hierarchical voting

DOI10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8MaRDI QIDQ1089231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrey V. Vladimirov, Fuad T. Aleskerov

Publication date 1986

Published in Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0020-0255(86)90053-8

zbMATH Keywords

collective binary relationsindependence of irrelevant alternativesindividual binary relationsvoting operators

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

The authors use voting operators to transform the sets of voters' opinions in the form of individual binary relations into collective binary relations. The emphasis of the discussion is of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives (locality) condition, extending a paper by \textit{J. A. Ferejohn} and \textit{P. C. Fishburn} [J. Econ. Theory 21, 28-45 (1979; Zbl 0413.90005)]. The authors succeeded in generalizing some of the well known results of voting theory.

Recommendations

• Functional local operators in voting theory. I
• Functional local operators in voting theory. II
• Dictatorial voting operators
• Local functional operators of partial and nonempty choice of alternatives
• Voting operators in the space of choice functions

Cites work

• Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
• Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle
• General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
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• Local operators in models of social choice
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Social choice and individual values
• The Arrow paradox in group choice theory (analysis of the problem)

Cited in

(11)

• Functional voting operators: The non-monotonic case
• Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions
• Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice
• Generalized Rawlsianism
• Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
• Dictatorial voting operators
• Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions.
• The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union
• A simple voting scheme generates all binary relations on finite sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7300319 (Why is no real title available?)
• Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice

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