Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.005zbMath1396.91150OpenAlexW2755049051MaRDI QIDQ1650278

Kui Ou-Yang

Publication date: 3 July 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

equityhierarchysocial welfare orderingstrong Pareto principlePigou-Dalton principleordinal social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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