Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
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Publication:1249511
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90068-6zbMath0385.90007OpenAlexW2068257996MaRDI QIDQ1249511
Louis Gevers, Robert Deschamps
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90068-6
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