Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis
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Publication:825189
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01344-xzbMath1484.91228OpenAlexW3131770632MaRDI QIDQ825189
Philippe Mongin, Marcus Pivato
Publication date: 17 December 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01344-x
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