The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory

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Publication:1300398

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00011-6zbMath0953.91009OpenAlexW3124120481WikidataQ127725844 ScholiaQ127725844MaRDI QIDQ1300398

Philippe Mongin

Publication date: 1 February 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00011-6




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