The impossibility of a paretian rational: a Bayesian perspective

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.12.008MaRDI QIDQ1934094zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Klaus Nehring

Publication date 28 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.008

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian aggregationgroup choicejudgment aggregationopinion poolPareto principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions
• Fully Bayesian aggregation
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Cites work

• Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
• Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
• Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory

Cited in

(15)

• Group decision making under uncertainty. A note on the aggregation of ordinal probabilities
• Instability of \textit{ex post} aggregation in the Bolker-Jeffrey framework and related instability phenomena
• Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership
• The probability of collective choice with shared knowledge structures
• The rarity of consistent aggregators
• Collective decision under ignorance
• Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions
• Rational belief changes for collective agents
• Decision making beyond arrow's “impossibility theorem,” with the analysis of effects of collusion and mutual attraction
• Bayesian Aggregation
• On the Origins of Imperfection and Apparent Non-rationality
• Welfare functions and group decisions
• Consistent judgement aggregation: the truth-functional case
• Introduction to judgment aggregation
• Justifiable group choice

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