The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
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Publication:3894849
DOI10.2307/1914003zbMath0448.62088OpenAlexW2021466440MaRDI QIDQ3894849
Aanund Hylland, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914003
Pareto optimalitydecision making under uncertaintyBayesian paradigmexpected utility functionBayesian group decision making
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Decision theory (91B06) Group preferences (91B10) Individual preferences (91B08) Statistical aspects of information-theoretic topics (62B10)
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