Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
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Publication:506537
DOI10.1007/S00224-016-9677-1zbMATH Open1356.91071DBLPjournals/mst/CechlarovaEFMMM16OpenAlexW1710593800WikidataQ59474046 ScholiaQ59474046MaRDI QIDQ506537FDOQ506537
Authors: Pavlos Eirinakis, Tamás Fleiner, Dimitrios Magos, Ioannis Mourtos, Eva Oceľáková, Baharak Rastegari, Katarina Cechlárová, David F. Manlove 
Publication date: 1 February 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9677-1
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Cited In (8)
- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
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