Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
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Cites work
- A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- Algorithms and Computation
- Assignment Problem Based on Ordinal Preferences
- Negative-cycle detection algorithms
- Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
Cited in
(8)- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
- Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
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