Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
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Recommendations
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: a positive result
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
Cited in
(35)- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms
- Fairly taking turns
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object
- Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
- Weighted fair division of indivisible items: a review
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
- Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness
- A general branch-and-bound algorithm for fair division problems
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Consistent bilateral assignment
- Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
- Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Markets for public decision-making
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- On the consistency of random serial dictatorship
- On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Characterizations of the sequential priority rules in the assignment of object types
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
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