Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects
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Publication:960253
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.02.003zbMATH Open1153.91414OpenAlexW1983186188MaRDI QIDQ960253FDOQ960253
Authors: François Maniquet 
Publication date: 16 December 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.003
Recommendations
Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)
Cites Work
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Fair social orderings
- The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian
- Fair Income Tax
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
- Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
- The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defense
- Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments
- Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
- Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
- On the nonexistence of envy-free and egalitarian-equivalent allocations in economies with indivisibilities
Cited In (2)
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