Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.003zbMath1155.91408OpenAlexW2142685049MaRDI QIDQ1005770

Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessprobabilistic serial mechanismrandom assignmentenvy-freenessordinal efficiencymultiple object assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (25)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Assignment problems with complementarities ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Multi-unit assignment under dichotomous preferences ⋮ On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation ⋮ An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem

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• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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