An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0475-9zbMATH Open1388.91116OpenAlexW2068562684MaRDI QIDQ328558FDOQ328558
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9
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stochastic dominanceNash equilibriumprobabilistic serialrandom assignmentrandom prioritysd-efficiencysd-no-envy
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
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- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Cited In (9)
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- The price of anarchy of probabilistic serial in one-sided allocation problems
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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