An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0475-9MaRDI QIDQ328558zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgün Ekici, Onur Kesten

Publication date 20 October 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic dominanceNash equilibriumprobabilistic serialrandom assignmentrandom prioritysd-efficiencysd-no-envy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A theory of school-choice lotteries
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• House allocation with existing tenants
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Kidney Exchange
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?

Cited in

(15)

• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
• Game-theoretically secure protocols for the ordinal random assignment problem
• Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• The price of anarchy of probabilistic serial in one-sided allocation problems
• An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
• Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms
• Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem

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