An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Publication:328558
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9zbMath1388.91116OpenAlexW2068562684MaRDI QIDQ328558
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9
Nash equilibriumstochastic dominanceprobabilistic serialrandom assignmentrandom prioritysd-efficiencysd-no-envy
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
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