Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
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Publication:697847
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2864zbMath1056.91018OpenAlexW1982598002MaRDI QIDQ697847
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2864
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Lectures on Polytopes
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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