Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
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Publication:6163283
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105618zbMath1518.91097OpenAlexW3215512069MaRDI QIDQ6163283
Lars Ehlers, Christian Basteck
Publication date: 9 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/256774
Related Items (2)
Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
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