Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1680102
Recommendations
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Cited in
(13)- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Random assignments of bundles
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
This page was built for publication: Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1680102)
