Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
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Publication:1680102
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.001zbMath1415.91174OpenAlexW2751637299MaRDI QIDQ1680102
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.08.001
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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