A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
The authors consider the special case of random assignment where the objects ranked in the same way by all agents, where opting out is feasible and where the agents differ about which objects are desirable. They introduce the new concept of ordinal efficiency which relies only on profile of ordinal deadlines. It views an assignment as inefficient if there is another feasible assignment that is Pareto superior for all cardinal utility profiles compatible with the given profile of deadlines. In the axiomatic analysis the authors restrict the attention to those mechanisms that only elicit an ordinal component of the agents' preferences, namely deadlines. The Probabilistic Serial assignment is introduced and characterized by No Envy and ordinal efficiency. The Probabilistic Serial mechanisim is then characterized by a combination of Ordinal Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals and strategy proofness.
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Arrays of distinct representatives --- a very simple NP-complete problem
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- Random assignments and outside options
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- A two-objective fuzzy \(k\)-cardinality assignment problem
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- On popular random assignments
- Social welfare in one-sided matching markets without money
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Assigning agents to a line
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Rank-optimal assignments in uniform markets
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
- Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Game-theoretically secure protocols for the ordinal random assignment problem
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
- On slots' scheduling
- A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence
- Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance
- Egalitarian random assignment
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- Random scheduling with deadlines under dichotomous preferences
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
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