An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0475-9MaRDI QIDQ328558zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Özgün Ekici, Onur Kesten

Publication date 20 October 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0475-9

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic dominanceNash equilibriumprobabilistic serialrandom assignmentrandom prioritysd-efficiencysd-no-envy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A theory of school-choice lotteries
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• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Kidney Exchange
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?

Cited in

(15)

• An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Game-theoretically secure protocols for the ordinal random assignment problem
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• The price of anarchy of probabilistic serial in one-sided allocation problems
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
• Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
• Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
• Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
• Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences

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