Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Constrained school choice
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
Cited in
(11)- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
- School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Stability vs. no justified envy
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