Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
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Publication:1684126
DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0562-6zbMATH Open1411.91419OpenAlexW3124030826MaRDI QIDQ1684126FDOQ1684126
Authors: Wonki Jo Cho, Battal Doğan 
Publication date: 8 December 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0562-6
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Cited In (11)
- School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Extensions of partial priorities and stability in school choice
- Sticky matching in school choice
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Epsilon-stability in school choice
- Stability vs. no justified envy
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
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