School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102496MaRDI QIDQ2051001zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paula Jaramillo, Flip Klijn, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date 1 September 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102496

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementationrank-priority mechanismsschool choicestability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
• Constrained school choice
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak

Cites work

• An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• On Representatives of Subsets
• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Truncation strategies in matching markets
• What you don't know can help you in school assignment

Cited in

(8)

• Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
• Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
• Stable matchings of teachers to schools
• A combinatorial auction improves school meals in Chile: a case of OR in developing countries
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice

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