Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.10.008MaRDI QIDQ1996172zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Siwei Chen, Eun Jeong Heo

Publication date 3 March 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicitypriority profileschool choice problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
• The cutoff structure of top trading cycles in school choice
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
• Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
• Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach

Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Robust stability in matching markets

Cited in

(4)

• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
• New axioms for top trading cycles
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
• Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure

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