Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
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Publication:2437801
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.005zbMath1282.91167MaRDI QIDQ2437801
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.005
stability; efficiency; matching; acyclicity; priority; market design; strategy-proofness; essential homogeneity
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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