Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
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Publication:2021788
DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1zbMath1461.91201OpenAlexW2950347886MaRDI QIDQ2021788
Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi
Publication date: 27 April 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1
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Cites Work
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