Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
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Publication:6077637
DOI10.1111/ijet.12214zbMath1530.91252OpenAlexW2939061774MaRDI QIDQ6077637
Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi
Publication date: 18 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12214
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