Incentives in landing slot problems
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Publication:2359379
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003zbMath1400.91381OpenAlexW2189178511MaRDI QIDQ2359379
Publication date: 28 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003
Related Items (7)
Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ A graph theoretic approach to the slot allocation problem ⋮ Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers ⋮ Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Reordering an existing queue ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
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