Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
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Publication:2416650
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.009zbMath1411.91353OpenAlexW3126039880MaRDI QIDQ2416650
C.-Philipp Heller, Philipp D. Dimakopoulos
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58080/1/68.pdf
stabilitywaiting timematching with contractsmany-to-one matchinglegal educationslot-specific choice functions
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