Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0616-8zbMATH Open1247.91123OpenAlexW3122686352MaRDI QIDQ453206FDOQ453206
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0616-8
Recommendations
dynamic mechanism designdynamic assignmentrevenue managementoverlapping generationsdurable objectspromotions and intertemporal assignments
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)
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Cited In (7)
- Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
- Project selection: commitment and competition
- Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
- Elementary results on solutions to the Bellman equation of dynamic programming: existence, uniqueness, and convergence
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- Calendar mechanisms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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