Calendar mechanisms
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Publication:2013347
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.004zbMath1393.91084OpenAlexW4242171993MaRDI QIDQ2013347
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4699301
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels ⋮ On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Dynamic screening with limited commitment
Cites Work
- Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Research Note—Strategic Bid-Shading and Sequential Auctioning with Learning from Past Prices
- Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist
- Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
- The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
- Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Optimal Auction Design
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- Optimal Dynamic Auctions and Simple Index Rules
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