Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.006MaRDI QIDQ694743zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maher Said

Publication date 13 December 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11456/1/MPRA_paper_11456.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designsequential allocationsequential ascending auctionsindirect mechanismsrandom arrivals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Declining valuations in sequential auctions
• Dynamic common agency.
• Dynamic price competition
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
• Research note-strategic bid-shading and sequential auctioning with learning from past prices
• Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
• Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• The dynamic pivot mechanism

Cited in

(14)

• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
• Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Sequential auctions and auction revenue
• Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• On multi-unit demand of dynamic sequential auctions in revenue management
• Technical note -- On revenue management with strategic customers choosing when and what to buy
• Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
• Prices versus auctions in large markets
• Calendar mechanisms
• Robust dynamic pricing with strategic customers

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