Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
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Publication:694743
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.05.006zbMATH Open1260.91113OpenAlexW2345033355MaRDI QIDQ694743FDOQ694743
Authors: Maher Said 
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11456/1/MPRA_paper_11456.pdf
Recommendations
dynamic mechanism designsequential allocationsequential ascending auctionsindirect mechanismsrandom arrivals
Cites Work
- Dynamic price competition
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- Optimal Auction Design
- Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
- Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
- Dynamic common agency.
- Declining valuations in sequential auctions
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
Cited In (14)
- Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Dynamic slot allocations with different patience levels
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
- On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
- Sequential auctions and auction revenue
- On multi-unit demand of dynamic sequential auctions in revenue management
- Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Technical note -- On revenue management with strategic customers choosing when and what to buy
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Calendar mechanisms
- Robust dynamic pricing with strategic customers
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