Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00010-8zbMath1054.91029MaRDI QIDQ1810427

Philip A. Haile

Publication date: 9 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

market models; valuation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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