Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement

DOI10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3zbMath1173.91369MaRDI QIDQ877780

Veronika Grimm

Publication date: 3 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/wp_series_download/wp0027.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sequential auctions; bundling; procurement; stochastic scale effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained, Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers, Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers, Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions

Cites Work

• A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
• Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
• An optimal auction for complements
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Sequential auctions with synergies: An example
• Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies