Simultaneous auctions with synergies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1367774
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0092zbMath0886.90055OpenAlexW3121362210MaRDI QIDQ1367774
Vijay Krishna, Robert W. Rosenthal
Publication date: 19 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b634be620a201b41786eb2ce67fb9cb8655de473
Related Items (32)
An optimal auction for complements ⋮ Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information ⋮ Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers ⋮ Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects ⋮ Sequential auctions with synergies: An example ⋮ A change in the timing of auctions with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior ⋮ TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction ⋮ A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids ⋮ Auctions with synergy and resale ⋮ On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts ⋮ Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra. ⋮ Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions ⋮ Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games. ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions ⋮ On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction ⋮ A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies ⋮ A New Analysis of Expected Revenue ⋮ Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study ⋮ Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods ⋮ A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions ⋮ Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints ⋮ Auctions of heterogeneous objects ⋮ Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions ⋮ Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment ⋮ Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions ⋮ Performance evaluation of multi-object auctions ⋮ Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods
This page was built for publication: Simultaneous auctions with synergies
