Multi-object auctions with resale: theory and experiment

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.10.008MaRDI QIDQ2345231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Kristian Lopez-Vargas, Erkut Y. Ozbay

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

multi-object auctionsresalepackagesecond-priceVickrey

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Auctions with synergy and resale
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions
• Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues
• Effects of resale in second-price auctions with private participation costs
• Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing

Cites work

• All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Auctions with synergy and resale
• Collusion via resale
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Combinatorial auctions: a survey
• Differentiation Under the Integral Sign
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• First price auctions with resale
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Optimal Auction with Resale
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

Cited in

(6)

• Asymmetric wheat auctions with resale and partially divisible bidding objects
• Charity auctions with multiple goods: bidding behavior and revenue
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5845905 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence

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• Z-Tree

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