Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

DOI10.1287/opre.1070.0384zbMath1167.91358OpenAlexW2085901354MaRDI QIDQ3392068

Michael H. Rothkopf

Publication date: 13 August 2009

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e2dd345f5930c62bd85fe54ae3183e0981db209b

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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