Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives

DOI10.1016/j.automatica.2023.110870zbMath1519.91075OpenAlexW4318951412MaRDI QIDQ6100445

Sabato Manfredi, David Angeli

Publication date: 22 June 2023

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2023.110870

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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