Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives
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Publication:6100445
DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2023.110870zbMATH Open1519.91075OpenAlexW4318951412MaRDI QIDQ6100445FDOQ6100445
Authors: David Angeli, Sabato Manfredi 
Publication date: 22 June 2023
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2023.110870
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