scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2163018

MaRDI QIDQ4673403zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti, Roger Wattenhofer, Giovanna Melideo, Peter Widmayer

Publication date 29 April 2005

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designalgorithms for the internetgame theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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