Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3MaRDI QIDQ6164498zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers, Guido Schäfer

Publication date 28 July 2023

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
• Bounding the inefficiency of altruism through social contribution games
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2088169 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Undominated Groves mechanisms
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

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