Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3zbMath1520.91091MaRDI QIDQ6164498

Guido Schäfer, Sjir Hoeijmakers, Ruben Brokkelkamp

Publication date: 28 July 2023

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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