Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_3zbMATH Open1520.91091MaRDI QIDQ6164498FDOQ6164498

Authors: Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers, Guido Schäfer 

Publication date: 28 July 2023

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Microeconomic theory
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Incentives in Teams
• Undominated Groves mechanisms
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR AND CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
• Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bounding the inefficiency of altruism through social contribution games

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