Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
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Publication:1001816
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003zbMath1216.91013OpenAlexW1993970692MaRDI QIDQ1001816
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (37)
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