Expressive markets for donating to charities

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.11.007zbMATH Open1231.91112OpenAlexW2044326855MaRDI QIDQ646531FDOQ646531

Authors: Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm 

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations
• Fair imposition
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• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms

Cited In (4)

• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust
• Impacts of earmarked private donations for disaster fundraising
• Learning by fund-raising

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