Expressive markets for donating to charities

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2010.11.007MaRDI QIDQ646531zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm

Publication date 17 November 2011

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.11.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5764907 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637614 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1416629 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
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• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fair imposition
• Incentives in Teams
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• Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
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• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions

Cited in

(4)

• Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
• Nonprofit organizations, free media and donor's trust
• Learning by fund-raising
• Impacts of earmarked private donations for disaster fundraising

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