An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
DOI10.1080/15427951.2004.10129086zbMATH Open1181.91077OpenAlexW2007201570WikidataQ106376689 ScholiaQ106376689MaRDI QIDQ4665444FDOQ4665444
Authors: Aaron Archer, Kunal Talwar, Éva Tardos, Christos Papadimitriou 
Publication date: 11 April 2005
Published in: Internet Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/15427951.2004.10129086
Recommendations
Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
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- Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
- Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Randomized mechanisms for multi-unit auctions (extended abstract)
- Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
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- Advances in Computing Science – ASIAN 2003. Progamming Languages and Distributed Computation Programming Languages and Distributed Computation
- SOFSEM 2004: Theory and Practice of Computer Science
- Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders
- Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
- Approximate composable truthful mechanism design
- On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
- Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
- Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles
- Combinatorial auctions with conflict-based externalities
- Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions
- Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
- Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
- Combinatorial auctions without money
- Coordinating monetary contributions in participatory budgeting
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