Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods

DOI10.1613/JAIR.4587MaRDI QIDQ3196307zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre, Orestis A. Telelis

Publication date 29 October 2015

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4587

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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