Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5891528
DOI10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.010zbMath1237.91114MaRDI QIDQ5891528
Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira, Noam Nisan
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Computer and System Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.010
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
68W25: Approximation algorithms
91A46: Combinatorial games
Related Items
Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the Vapnik--Chervonenkis Dimension, Setting lower bounds on truthfulness, A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions, Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets, The cross-entropy method for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions, Online pricing for multi-type of items, Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach, Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms, Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders, Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World, Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities
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