Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:3603458
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7zbMath1171.91330MaRDI QIDQ3603458
Publication date: 17 February 2009
Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
68W25: Approximation algorithms
68W20: Randomized algorithms
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