Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7MaRDI QIDQ3603458zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date 17 February 2009

Published in Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Randomized algorithms (68W20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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(24)

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• Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions
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• An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions
• Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
• A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
• Economic efficiency requires interaction
• Interpolating between truthful and non-truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7765404 (Why is no real title available?)
• Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
• Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding
• The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds
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• Sketching valuation functions
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Worst-case mechanism design via Bayesian analysis
• Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
• Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
• Combinatorial auctions without money

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