Two Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions
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Publication:3603458
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7zbMATH Open1171.91330OpenAlexW1580387990MaRDI QIDQ3603458FDOQ3603458
Authors: Shahar Dobzinski 
Publication date: 17 February 2009
Published in: Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74208-1_7
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Cited In (24)
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- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
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- Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
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