On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design

DOI10.1137/090780146zbMATH Open1285.91048OpenAlexW2152846304MaRDI QIDQ5408767FDOQ5408767

Authors: Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi 

Publication date: 11 April 2014

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/090780146

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zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designmulti-unit auctionstruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (6)

• Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design
• Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012
• A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding

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