On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

DOI10.1137/090780146zbMath1285.91048OpenAlexW2152846304MaRDI QIDQ5408767

Shaddin Dughmi, Shahar Dobzinski

Publication date: 11 April 2014

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/090780146

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsalgorithmic mechanism designtruthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness ⋮ A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012 ⋮ Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding

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