Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
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Publication:1651232
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001zbMath1400.91228arXiv1507.08708OpenAlexW1884453815MaRDI QIDQ1651232
Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.08708
schedulingalgorithmic mechanism designBayesian incentive-compatible mechanismsrandomized truthful mechanismstruthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms
Bayesian inference (62F15) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling ⋮ The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design
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