Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
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Publication:2345204
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.001zbMath1311.91120OpenAlexW2047815293MaRDI QIDQ2345204
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.001
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