On Multi-dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11zbMath1260.91109OpenAlexW154126010MaRDI QIDQ3645310

Ahuva Mu'alem

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_11

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingmechanism designanonymous prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium ⋮ A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings ⋮ Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms

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