scientific article

zbMath1302.68127MaRDI QIDQ2934709

Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira

Publication date: 18 December 2014

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Distributed algorithms (68W15)

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