Publication:2934709
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zbMath1302.68127MaRDI QIDQ2934709
Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
Publication date: 18 December 2014
90B35: Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
68Q17: Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.)
68W15: Distributed algorithms
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