Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
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Publication:2934709
zbMATH Open1302.68127MaRDI QIDQ2934709FDOQ2934709
Authors: Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira 
Publication date: 18 December 2014
Recommendations
Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Distributed algorithms (68W15)
Cited In (29)
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
- A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
- Truthful mechanisms for two-range-values variant of unrelated scheduling
- On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks
- A lower bound of \(1+\varphi \) for truthful scheduling mechanisms
- Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
- The power of verification for one-parameter agents
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems
- Scheduling without payments
- Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
- Improved lower bounds for non-utilitarian truthfulness
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values
- Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
- Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
- Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- Distributed algorithmic mechanism design for scheduling on unrelated machines
- Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agents
- Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
- Unrelated parallel machine scheduling -- perspectives and progress
- Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
- On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
- A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines
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