The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money
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Publication:2819467
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_24zbMath1403.91055arXiv1607.03688OpenAlexW2471888476MaRDI QIDQ2819467
Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias
Publication date: 29 September 2016
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03688
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