Scheduling Selfish Tasks: About the Performance of Truthful Algorithms

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_20zbMath1206.90041OpenAlexW1567235199MaRDI QIDQ3608844

Fanny Pascual, Laurent Gourvès, George Christodoulou

Publication date: 6 March 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5907

zbMATH Keywords

schedulingalgorithmic game theorytruthful algorithms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (11)

Coordination mechanisms ⋮ Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation ⋮ Scheduling without payments ⋮ The anarchy of scheduling without money ⋮ Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs ⋮ Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms ⋮ Truthfulness for the Sum of Weighted Completion Times ⋮ The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money ⋮ Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines ⋮ On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks ⋮ Tighter price of anarchy for selfish task allocation on selfish machines

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