Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_29zbMath1403.68024OpenAlexW2402812131MaRDI QIDQ3460805

Annamária Kovács, Ulrich Meyer, Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 8 January 2016

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_29

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location ⋮ Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments

Uses Software

• STXXL

Cites Work

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• Algorithmic mechanism design

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